

Message Text

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ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-10 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-12 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 /106 R

DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:TNILES/AF/W:MCEATON
APPROVED BY IO:CWMAYNES
IO/UNP:RLBARRY
AF/W:WSMITH
AF:WHARROP
L:SSCHWEBEL (DRAFT)
NEA/AFN:JBISHOP

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O 112222Z PEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 037068

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, UNSC, CD, LY

SUBJECT: CHAD: BACKGROUND FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CON-

SIDERATIONS, FEBRUARY 9

REF: 1) USUN 422 (NOTAL), 2) USUN 463

1. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF CHADIAN COMPLAINT COULD BE USEFUL, BOTH IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE PROBLEM POSED BY CHAD'S DISPUTE WITH LIBYA AND IN WIDER AFRICAN (AND MIDDLE EAST) CONTEXT, AND MISSION SHOULD SUPPORT CHADIAN REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING, EVEN IF AFRICA GROUP REMAINS UNENTHUSIASTIC. A DEBATE SHOULD FOCUS USEFUL PUBLIC ATTENTION ON WHAT HAS BEEN AN OBSCURE LAND GRAB AND INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY BY LIBYA, AND THUS POSSIBLY CONSTRAIN LIBYA IN SOME MEASURE. WHILE IT WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS POINT TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC RESOLUTIONS, OUR INITIAL THINKING IS THAT A DESIRABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE INCLUDING:

A) INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS/TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY;
B) PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AN

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OAU REPRESENTATIVE (OR CONCILIATION COMMITTEE), OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL;
C) NON-INTERVENTION OF ALL OUTSIDE STATES IN SUPPORT OF INSURGENCIES; AND
D) RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES TO DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WHERE THEY WISH TO HAVE IT.

2. WE WOULD ALSO SEE MERIT IN A PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES. IN ADDITION TO REPORTING BACK TO THE SYG, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT BE INSTRUCTED TO COORDINATE HIS ACTIVITIES WITH THOSE OF OAU-DESIGNATED COMMITTEE OR INDIVIDUAL.

3. IN VIEW OF STRONG FRENCH INTEREST IN CHAD PROBLEM, YOU SHOULD COORDINATE YOUR HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE CLOSELY WITH FRENCH MISSION.

4. THE PARALLEL BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN CHAD AND THE HORN CONFLICT LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT OUR APPROACH TO A CHAD DEBATE COULD AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE HORN. THEREFORE, WHILE SUPPORTING THE FRENCH POSITION TO THE DEGREE POSSIBLE, WE WANT TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE HAVING THE DEBATE TURN INTO AN EXERCISE IN BLAME-SHIFTING AND WORK FOR CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOMES WHICH COULD ADVANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMILAR DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD BE

THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION ON THE HORN. ONE POSSIBLE MEANS FOR AVOIDING ACRIMONIOUS PUBLIC DEBATE OVER TERMS OF RESOLUTION WOULD BE TO HOLD FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING, AT WHICH CHAD AND LIBYA COULD PRESENT OPPOSING CASES, AND THEN SHIFT TO INFORMAL MEETINGS FOR PURPOSE OF DRAFTING RESOLUTION.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, SHOULD SUCH A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME BE THWARTED BY INFLUENCE OF LIBYA AND SOVIET SUPPORT
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OF LIBYA, THAT OF ITSELF WILL BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE PRINCIPLED POSITIONS WHICH USSR AND LIBYA PROFESS TO HOLD IN RESPECT OF HORN AND MIDDLE EAST DISPUTES.

6. FOLLOWING IS BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON CHAD-LIBYA DISPUTE:

7. THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE, BUT RELATED ISSUES IN CHAD'S ACCUSATIONS AGAINST LIBYA. FIRST OF ALL, LIBYA HAS A BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHAD, AND HAS MILITARILY OCCUPIED THE DISPUTED AREA. SECONDLY, LIBYA SUPPORTS

AND ENCOURAGES AN INSURGENT MOVEMENT (FROLINAT) WHICH HAS BEEN STRUGGLING AGAINST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY FOR MORE THAN A DECADE.

8. BORDER DISPUTE. SINCE MID-1973 LIBYA HAS OCCUPIED A SIXTY MILE DEEP STRIP OF LAND, KNOWN AS THE AOZOU STRIP, FROM A SMALL MILITARY BASE AT AOZOU OASIS. THE CHADIAN MILITARY HAD OCCUPIED THE AOZOU OASIS UNTIL 1968 WHEN THE STRIP WAS ABANDONED TO THE REBELS. LIBYA HAS NOW INSTALLED CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS AND CONTROLS THE REGION WITH MILITARY PATROLS. MINERAL DEPOSITS -- URANIUM, MANGANESE, AND WOLFRAM -- ARE THOUGHT TO BE BEHIND LIBYA'S INTEREST IN THE STILL UNEXPLORED TIBESTI AREA.

9. LIBYA'S CLAIMS ON THE STRIP ARE BASED ON THOSE OF LIBYA'S SENOUSI KINGS PRIOR TO THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF CHAD AND ON THE 1935 MUSSOLINI-LAVAL TREATY UNDER WHICH FRANCE AGREED TO CEDE THE AREA NOW CLAIMED BY LIBYA TO ITALY IN RETURN FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE. LIBYA ALSO CLAIMS PARTS OF NIGER AND
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ALGERIA UNDER THE SAME TREATY. THE 1935 TREATY WAS NEVER RATIFIED BY THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WAS DENOUNCED BY BOTH FRANCE AND ITALY IN 1940.

10. CHAD'S CLAIM ON THE AREA IS BASED ON THE ANGLO-FRENCH ACCORDS OF 1899 AND 1919. CHAD'S CLAIMS WERE APPROVED BY THE FRANCO-LIBYAN TREATY OF 1955 AND ARE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AS DETERMINING THE PRESENT CHAD-LIBYAN BORDER.

11. AN OAU AD HOC COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED AT THE LIBREVILLE SUMMIT LAST SUMMER TO EXAMINE CHAD AND LIBYA'S CONFLICTING BORDER CLAIMS. MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE ARE ALGERIA, CAMEROON, GABON, MOZAMBIQUE, NIGERIA, AND SENEGAL. THUS FAR LIBYA HAS FAILED TO ATTEND TWO OAU SPONSORED MEETINGS AND HAS NOT YET PRESENTED ANY MATERIAL TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF EXPERTS DESIGNATED TO GATHER EVIDENCE ON THE TWO COUNTRIES' CLAIMS. IN ADDITION TO THE OAU EFFORTS, PRESIDENTS KOUNTCHE OF NIGER, EYADEMA OF TOGO, AND NUMAYRI OF SUDAN HAVE ENGAGED IN INDEPENDENT EFFORTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN CHAD AND LIBYA.

12. CHAD'S DECISION TO PRESENT ITS CASE REGARDING LIBYA'S OCCUPATION OF THE AOZOU STRIP REPRESENTS, IN PART, ITS FRUSTRATION WITH THE INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS OF THE OAU TO RESOLVE THE CASE. BECAUSE OF LIBYAN

INVOLVEMENT IN THE CURRENT REBEL OFFENSIVE IN NORTHERN CHAD, CHAD DECIDED TO SUSPEND RELATIONS WITH LIBYA FEBRUARY 6 AND ASKED LIBYAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY BY FEBRUARY 13. THE SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS FURTHER COMPLICATES THE PROCESS OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. CHAD CANCELLED OUT OF A MEETING WITH LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN NIAMEY, NIGER ON FEBRUARY 7 AND HAS DECIDED NOT TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ATTEND THE NEXT OAU FOREIGN MINISTERS SUMMIT TO BE HELD IN TRIPOLI LATER THIS MONTH. FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF PROGRESS IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH LIBYA, AS WELL AS AFRICAN REGIONAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE BORDER ISSUE, CHAD NOW IS TURNING TO THE UN FOR HELP.

13. AGGRESSION. CHAD'S CASE FOR CHARGING LIBYA WITH MILITARY AGGRESSION STEMS FROM LIBYAN ASSISTANCE TO REBEL FORCES OPERATING IN CHAD. THE REBELLION IN CHAD IS PART OF A COMPLEX TRIBAL-RELIGIOUS FEUD BETWEEN MUSLIM NORTHERNERS AND NON-MUSLIM SOUTHERNERS WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR CENTURIES. CHAD'S REBEL MOVEMENT, THE CHAD LIBERATION FRONT (FROLINAT) FOUNDED IN 1966, IS DIVIDED INTO AT LEAST FOUR SEPARATE FACTIONS WITH BOTH PRO-LIBYAN AND ANTI-LIBYAN ELEMENTS.

14. LIBYA SUPPORTS FROLINAT FOR IDEOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ECONOMIC REASONS -- THE MINERALS POTENTIAL OF THE

AREA BROADLY KNOWN AS THE BET (BORKOU-ENNEDI-TIBESTI). THE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD BELIEVES THAT LIBYA WISHES TO REPLACE IT WITH A RADICAL MUSLIM, OR FAILING THAT, SET UP AN AUTONOMOUS MUSLIM GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY UNDER LIBYAN DOMINATION. PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT HAS SOUGHT TO ASSIST CHAD, BECAUSE HE BELIEVES LIBYA'S INTERVENTION IN CHAD IS PART OF A LARGER PLAN TO UNDERMINE ITS MORE MODERATE NEIGHBORS.

15. LIBYA PROVIDES FROLINAT WITH TRAINING, FINANCING, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND WEAPONS. IN EARLY JULY 1977 THE CHADIAN GOVERNMENT LOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE TIBESTI MOUNTAINS WHEN FROLINAT REBELS OVERRAN BARDAI, THE GOVERNMENT'S NORTHERN-MOST OUTPOST. AFTER A SIX-MONTH LULL IN FIGHTING, LIBYAN-BACKED
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REBELS RESUMED THE OFFENSIVE LAST WEEK BY ATTACKING FAYA-LARGEAU, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPITAL OF NORTHERN CHAD AND THE KEY GOVERNMENT GARRISON. A SERIOUS NEW ELEMENT IN THE OFFENSIVE IS THE DOWNING OF TWO CHADIAN AIR FORCE PLANES BY WHAT ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SAM-7 MISSILES. TWO SMALLER OUTPOSTS ARE ALSO NOW UNDER ATTACK. LOSS OF FAYA WOULD REQUIRE CHADIAN FORCES

TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NORTH AND ABANDON THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY TO THE REBELS.

16. THE DEGREE OF DIRECT LIBYAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CURRENT FIGHTING IS UNKNOWN. LIBYA IS THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF ARMS TO THE REBELS AND HAS BEEN RESUPPLYING THE REBEL FORCES BESIEGING FAYA. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT ALSO PERMITS FROLINAT TO BROADCAST ON RADIO TRIPOLI, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THESE BROADCASTS HAVE BEEN USED TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO REBEL UNITS OPERATING IN THE FIELD. CHAD, WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE NO ATTEMPTS TO BLOC THESE BROADCASTS HAS NOW BEGUN TO JAM THEIR TRANSMISSION. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT LIBYAN TROOPS ARE OPERATING WITH THE REBELS IN THE FIELD, THE CHADIAN GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THAT LIBYANS AND OTHER "FOREIGNERS" (READ CUBANS) ARE ASSISTING THE INSURGENTS.

17. THE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD HAS EARNESTLY SOUGHT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF THE DIVERSE FROLINAT MOVEMENT. ON FEBRUARY 5 THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD REACHED A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WITH ONE OF THE REBEL LEADERS, HISSEIN HABRE, WHICH INCLUDED GENERAL POLITICAL AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES, AND A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION WHICH WILL ORGANIZE ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUANT ASSEMBLY WHICH WILL DRAFT A NEW CONSTITUTION.

ANOTHER KEY FROLINAT LEADER, DR. ABBA SIDDIK, IS ALSO
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IN THE FINAL STAGES OF RECONCILING WITH THE GOVERNMENT.
THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE MAY BE DESIGNED, IN PART, TO
FRUSTRATE THESE EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

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APPROVED BY: AF/W:TWMSMITH

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 037068

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 037068, SENT USUN INFO BONN LONDON
MOSCOW OTTAWA PARIS BERN BRUSSELS CAIRO JIDDA KHARTOUM KINSHASA
LIBREVILLE NIAMEY ROME TEHRAN TRIPOLI NEW DELHI KUWAIT LAGOS
PORT LOUIS LA PAZ 11 FEB:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 037068

E.O. 11652: GDS

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CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BRIEFING MATERIALS, DISPUTES, MEETINGS, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Unique ID: 00
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Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
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From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Litigation History:
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Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 1) USUN 422 (NOTAL), 2) USUN 463
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Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 970828
Subject: CHAD: BACKGROUND FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CON- SIDERATIONS, FEBRUARY 9
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